A major difficulty in designing auctions is that valuations are private and bidders need to be incentivized to report their valuations truthfully. The goal is to learn an incentive compatible auction that maximizes revenue.
In a seminal piece of work, Myerson resolved the optimal auction design problem when there is a single item for sale (Myerson, 1981). Quite astonishingly, even after 30-40 years of intense research, the problem is not completely resolved even for a simple setting with two bidders and two items."

Source : Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning,
_{[ Ref. Myerson, R. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58–73, ]}

The research team who authored the paper cited above used AI LLM techniques to try and find a way of optimizing any auction with more than one item for sale, pointing out its practical importance, as auctions are used routinely across industries and by the public sector to organize the sale of their products and services.